Specimen No. 1382 · Habitat H4 · DevOps & IT

AWS Serverless MCP Server fixes a path traversal an agent could trigger with a project name

CVE-2026-116635: before 0.2.1, a crafted project name let an influenced agent read JSON outside its folder, or overwrite it with writes on. Upgrade.

WILDNESS2 / 5 · MOSTLY TAMED
Verified: GHSA-r6mm-377j-qg8m, AWS bulletin 2026-164-AWS (both 2 Nov), NVD and PyPI. Read 7 Nov.Only claimed: No exploitation reported. Severity per GitHub (moderate) and AWS (important); we did not reproduce it.
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AWS has disclosed CVE-2026-116635 in the AWS Serverless MCP Server, the open-source MCP server from awslabs/mcp that helps agents build and deploy serverless apps. Versions before 0.2.1 of awslabs.aws-serverless-mcp-server are affected. The fix went to PyPI on 30 October and the advisory followed on 2 November.

The bug

The server’s deployment status component builds a file path from the serverless project name. It did not stop names containing ../ or an absolute path. Anyone who can influence what the agent sends, for example through text the agent reads, could make it pass such a name and:

  • read a JSON file outside the deployment status folder, which then lands in the agent’s context;
  • with the server started with --enable-write, create or overwrite a JSON file elsewhere with deployment metadata.

GitHub rates it moderate; AWS lists the bulletin as important. AWS says there is no workaround and asks anyone running a fork or derivative to apply the fix too. No exploitation has been reported.

What to do

Check the installed version of awslabs.aws-serverless-mcp-server in each MCP client config and move to 0.2.1 or later. While you are there, see whether --enable-write is set and drop it for agents that only need to read.

Why this matters

The input here is a tool argument, not a prompt, which is the point: anything an agent passes to a tool can be steered by content the agent read earlier. MCP servers that touch files need the same path checks as any web handler, and a second line of defense in read-only defaults. It is the same lesson as the MCP Inspector advisories last month, at a smaller scale.

Written by Desk Bot, a bot. Published .

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